We study the effect of geographical distance between the contracting parties on the timing of the licensing deal. Using insights from the transaction costs theory, we argue that geographical distance increases the search, information and contracting costs. We investigate this question using a novel dataset of licensing deals in France, containing geo-localization of parties together with detailed demographic and patent information. To identity the effect of geographical distance as a market friction, we control for the confounding determinants of the timing of the transaction. Because of the possibility that firms with similar interests may gather in business clusters, we argue that it is also important to control for the market and technology characteristics of the parties. We find that geographic distance delays the transaction, and that this effect is strong for SMEs. We also find market proximity to be a significant delayer of the licensing transaction. Our findings provide evidence for the existence of a local characteristic to markets for technology, which are usually seen as global.
Introduction
Markets for technologies sit at the heart of the innovation system. They organize the formal acquisition of knowledge and enable the emergence of a class of innovation producers, leading to gains from trade (Arora et al., 2001 (Arora et al., , 2004 . These markets are also pivotal for driving demand size (Shepard, 1987) , product variety (Spulber, 2008) and innovation incentives (Spulber, 2013) .
However, markets for technologies are prone to failure (Caves et al., 1983 ) and a growing body of literature has paid attention to their functioning. Agrawal et al. (2015) provide a systematic analysis of the sources of frictions including lack of market thickness, congestion, and lack of market safety.
Other studies have focused on specific aspects of these markets such as the role of trust (Jensen et al., 2015) , and the effect of formal intellectual property rights (Gans et al., 2008) , search costs (Hegde and Luo, 2017) and competition (Allain et al., 2015) on the timing of licensing.
One aspect that has been overlooked is the role of the geographic distance between parties. We know from previous studies that geographic distance affects inventive activities, most notably knowledge spillovers (e.g., Jaffe et al. 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Almeida and Kogut 1997) . But the literature on distance and markets for technology is very thin. Drivas and Economidou (2015) show that geographic proximity matters for the flows of patent transactions across US states. De Marco et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that U/S. patents with a foreign priority have a lower probability of being traded in the United States than local patents with a U.S. priority. These studies provide a first hint that geographical distance may distort markets for technology. However, many factors may conflate with geographic distance and existing literature does not account for confounding factors.
This paper contributes to the literature on markets for technology by discussing and documenting the effect of geographic distance on the timing of licensing. This issue is of concern because excessive transaction delays undermine the efficiency arguments related to markets for technologies. Because of the limited lifetime of patents, delays in transactions lower transaction value. They also induce longer commercialization delays, which harms social welfare. Finally, longer delays may also increase the risk of duplication of Research and Development (R&D) projects.
Note that longer transaction delays may not necessarily reflect frictions on the market for technology. The nature and type of the transferred technology, as well as the characteristics of the contracting parties also determine the timing of the transaction. Therefore, in order to identify whether geographical distance induces frictions, we need to control for confounding market determinants of the timing of the transaction.
A priori, technology is a non-rival and intangible good that should belong to a global market.
However, using insights from transaction costs theory, we first explain why distance adversely affects the timing of licensing. In short, distance increases both search costs and negotiation costs, resulting in longer transaction delays. Next, due to the possibility that firms with similar interests may agglomerate in business clusters, we argue that it is important to control for the market and technology characteristics of the parties. Finally, we explain that SMEs may be particularly more affected by distance than large firms.
The empirical analysis exploits a novel dataset of licensing deals in France. Focusing on transactions for which both parties are located in the same country comes at the cost of reducing heterogeneity in the variable of interest, that is, distance. However, it allows us to hold constant the legal environment and other unobservable factors that may be correlated with our measure of distance, thereby providing a conservative empirical set-up. Besides, it also allows us to collect detailed buyer and seller information. Our sample totals 306 transactions and contains geo-localization of parties together with demographic information, information on their patent portfolios and on their previous activity on markets for technologies.
The empirical analysis confirms that licensing deals between geographically distant parties take longer to occur. On average, an increase of one in the logarithm of the geographical distance between the contracting parties decreases the probability of immediate licensing by 17%. The effect is particularly strong for deals between two SMEs, for which an increase of one in the logarithm of distance is decreases the licensing hazard rate by more than 22%. Our results show that there is a strong local characteristic of markets for technology.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the timing of licensing, using a simple transaction cost framework. Section 3 introduces our identification strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the estimation results and shows robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
The timing of licensing
An efficient functioning of the market for technologies eases the vertical specialization of firms, and accelerates the development of innovation. It allows firms to focus on the stage of the innovation process on which they have comparative advantages. This specialization among actors often results in start-ups focusing on the early stages of the innovation process, and actors with production and distribution capabilities focusing on the later stages (Teece, 1986; Arora et al., 2001) . Specialization allows market incumbent to avoid incurring the cost of duplicating R&D of the new market entrant, and allows start-ups to avoid incurring the cost of investment in complementary assets (Gans and Stern, 2003) . As each actor specializes on the innovation stage it is the best at, commercial delays are shortened, which benefits social welfare. The well functioning of the market for technologies also facilitates the development of complementary technologies, enhancing the value of current technology and contributing to economic growth (Schmookler, 1966) .
Previous literature has identified several sources of delays of technology transfers, such as the uncertainty of property rights (Gans et al., 2008) , the market structure (Allain et al., 2015) , and search costs (Hegde and Luo, 2017) . We build on this literature, and investigate the effect of geographical distance between the seller and the buyer on licensing delays. This section provides a formal transaction cost framework on the relationship between the timing of the licensing contract and the geographical distance.
A simple framework
Lett be the time at which the technology is submitted to the patent system and available for license, and T * be the time at which it is actually licensed. Figure 1 shows that the period before the completion of the deal can be decomposed into two distinct periods. During the search phase, the seller and the buyer try to find each other on the market for technologies. At t o , the two actors meet: the search period ends, and the negotiation period starts. During the negotiation period, the buyer collects information to reduce her uncertainty regarding the value of the technology, and both parties discuss contractual agreements in order to reduce the legal risk associated with the transaction.
Searching
We assume that both parties search on the market for technologies fromt. The seller is willing to license her patent, while the buyer is willing to implement the technology. The search phase is costly to both parties.
Sellers need to understand the various uses and applications of their technologies, which is costly.
Similarly, buyers need to understand the specificities and functioning of inventions, which are not easily understandable from patent documents. Besides, parties need to find each other to initiate contact and assess interest. Sellers and buyers therefore might have difficulties meeting each other on the market for technologies, generating important search costs and longer searching periods resulting in delayed licensing transactions (Hegde and Luo, 2017) .
The role of geographical distance
As geographical distance between the buyer and the seller increases, it becomes more difficult for parties to meet. In theory, markets for intangible goods are not affected by physical or spatial constraints.
In practice, however, geographical distance reduces the pace of information diffusion (e.g., Gertler 2003) . As geographical distance between the buyer and the seller becomes more important, it is likely that the length of the search period increases.
Negotiating
Parties start negotiating at t o , when the buyer learns about the existence of the patent, and the seller learns about the interest of the buyer for her patent. Let t f be the time at which the patent loses its economic value due to the expiration of the legal protection or to the obsolescence of the technology.
Both parties have a null valuation for the patent at t f .
Let V b (t) be the value of the patent for the buyer at time t. At t o , the buyer has an initial valuation
Because V E is based on the buyer's own belief on the technology, it is highly uncertain. At each period t, the buyer learns information on the patent.
We denote the degree of information available to the buyer as B I (t). 1 Waiting to reduce uncertainty is costly to the buyer. Due to the limited lifetime of the patent (the "horizon effect", Serrano 2010),
The quantity B I (t) captures the cost of uncertainty to the buyer, so that dB I dt > 0. 2 Furthermore, the marginal benefit of information is decreasing as the buyer accumulates more knowledge regarding the patent, so that
dt 2 < 0. The value of the patent for the buyer is thus increasing over time as long as the marginal benefit of information is greater than her devaluation due to the horizon effect.
Let V s (t) be the value of the patent for the seller at time t. The seller has perfect information on the value of her patent at any time. At t o , V s (t o ) = V o . The seller has to share information 1 We posit BI (to) = 1 2 Note that the assumption that dB I dt > 0 is not a critical one. There might be negative information that decreases the value of the patent to the buyer. However, it is critical that t f to BI (t) dt > 0 so that there is room for a deal.
about the economic and technological aspects of the patent. She also has to prevent expropriation due to the uncontrolled leakage of information (Arrow, 1962) with a sophisticated contract. The seller values the reduction of the legal uncertainty provided by clearer contract terms. We denote the legal certainty associated with the contract B C (t). 3 But waiting to have a better legal framework increases the contracting costs to the seller. Because the patent has a limited lifetime, and because the sophistication of the terms of the contract consumes human and financial resources, her total expected profit from licensing decreases by D s at each period. Therefore,
Improving the legal framework is always beneficial to the seller, so that B C (t) captures the cost of uncertainty to the seller, i.e. dB C dt > 0. However, the marginal benefit of an additional term to the contract is decreasing as the contract matures, and
The value of the patent for the seller decreases over time if the reduction of the legal uncertainty does not offset the horizon effect.
We assume that the deal is sealed when the buyer's valuation for the patent first meets the seller's valuation. The licensing deal occurs at T * , with V B (T * ) = V S (T * ). 4 This framework is represented in Figure 1a .
Figure 1b: Licensing with distance
The role of geographical distance
As mentioned, the buyer incurs costs to acquire information in order to value the invention. Indeed, the knowledge embedded in a technology takes on various degrees of codification, and not all is explicitly laid out in the patent specification (Kogut and Zander, 1992 buyer needs to acquire tacit knowledge from the seller and devote time, resources and efforts (Spulber, 2012) , thereby incurring information costs. Tacit knowledge takes the form of judgement, creativity, capability and understanding of the invention (Polanyi, 1966) , and therefore is not embodied in the patent. Tacit knowledge is distinct from information and is hard to express through direct words. It is communicated using examples, metaphors, drawings, and other informal mediums of expression.
Therefore, absorbing tacit knowledge require direct human interactions between the buyer and the seller.
As geographical distance between parties increases, the cost of absorbing the tacit knowledge, or learning, increases for the buyer. Indeed, the geographical context constrains human interactions (Howells, 2002) , and learning might be site-specific. Geographical distance makes human interactions more costly to happen, through increased screening, travel and interpretation costs.
The impact of geographical distance on the learning process of the buyer is represented on Fig- ure 1b, where V B is the value of the patent for the buyer when she is geographically distant from the seller. B I is negatively affected by the geographical distance because of the increased costs, so that
As geographical distance between the parties increases, it also becomes more important for the seller to design properly the terms of the contract. Indeed, distance makes it harder for her to detect an unauthorized use of her technology. Thus, as geographical distance augments, the seller relies more on the contractual framework to protect her technology. Therefore, the utility she derives from more sophisticated contracting terms increases with the distance d, so that ∂B C ∂d > 0. V S is thus higher as illustrated in Figure 1b . With geographical distance, the licensing deal is concluded at T * * > T * .
To sum up, geographical distance increases search, information and contracting costs. It increases search costs because geographical distance makes it harder for the parties to meet. It increases information costs because the buyer needs to incur additional screening, travel and interpretation costs to acquire the tacit knowledge underlying the technology. Finally, it increases contracting costs because the seller compensates higher legal uncertainty with a more sophisticated contractual framework. As a result we propose: Hypothesis 1. The timing of the licensing deal increases with geographical distance.
It should be mentioned that, given that geographical distance is likely to increase transaction costs to both buyers and sellers, distant deals are more likely to fail. Indeed, search costs may be so high that parties never meet, and the magnitude of information and contracting costs may prevent the successful realisation of the deal. This paper follows the recent stream of the literature studying the factors affecting the timing of licensing deals, conditional on the successful realization of the transaction (Gans et al., 2008; Allain et al., 2015; Hegde and Luo, 2017) . The analysis is concerned with understanding how distance affects the timing of technology transactions, conditionally on the transaction occurring. It is thus silent on the factors affecting the likelihood of a deal.
SMEs vs. large firms
There are many reasons to believe that geographic distance might be more harmful for deals involving SMEs, compared to larger firms. Regarding the search phase, larger firms are able to cast a wider net in their search for a licensing partner or in their screening for new technologies. Smaller firms, on the contrary, may be better at exploiting their informal network to identify opportunities. Because informal networks tend to be geographically bounded, SMEs may perform a predominantly local search.
Regarding the negotiation phase, contracting on the market for technology is a complex activity and large firms, with superior legal capabilities and accumulated experience, are better able to draft contracting terms. As mentioned above, a robust contractual framework becomes all the more important as geographic distance increases. To the extent that technology licensing negotiation is not an adversarial process, smaller firms may benefit from the larger firm's capabilities in deal involving a small and a large actor. However, transactions between two geographically distant SMEs may be particularly costly. We propose: Hypothesis 2. SMEs are more sensitive to geographical distance than large companies.
Clusters and the fallacy of distance
The main empirical challenge we face lies in the fact that related entities may tend to gather into business clusters, where they might benefit from advanced facilities and knowledge spillovers. Clusters are agglomeration of actors that target similar markets and/or exploit similar technologies. Take the example of the French "Aerospace Valley". If we observe that deals happening between two parties located in the Aerospace Valley occur faster than when one party is located in the Aerospace Valley and the other is situated elsewhere, we need to make sure that the transaction has occurred faster because the two parties were geographically close. The alternative explanation is that the deal was fast because parties were similar, which led them to co-locate in the same cluster.
However, the role of market and technological proximity on the timing of licensing is unclear. On the one hand, market and technological proximity is likely to mitigate the effect of the geographic distance on the search phase. Firms are more likely to know about each other if they operate in the same market or exploit the same technology, leading to a faster match and thus to a decrease of the search phase. Market and technological proximity is also likely to reduce the information costs to the buyer, who can better apprehend the technological value, market potential and legal boundaries of the invention. On the other hand, as market and technology proximity increases, it becomes more important for both parties to design properly the terms of the contract. Indeed, the risks of patent infringement and second-party expropriation are higher, leading to more complex negotiation. Designing more sophisticated contractual terms requires the seller to invest more human and financial resources, thereby increasing contracting costs. We propose:
Hypothesis 3.The market proximity of the parties has an ambiguous effect on the timing of licensing. The technological proximity has a similarly ambiguous effect. Their net effects on the timing of licensing depend on the magnitude of the effects on the search, information, and negotiation costs.
3 Empirical approach
Sampling strategy
In order to test the hypotheses described in the previous section, we rely on a novel and detailed dataset of licensing deals.
We focus on transactions concluded between French actors, i.e., between a licensor and a licensee who both reported an address in France to the patent office. Indeed, in order to identify the causal effect of distance, we need to control for all the other factors possibly affecting the timing of the negotiations, and non orthogonal to the distance. International deals are likely to be affected by various institutional factors that are difficult to fully control for. For instance, the legal constraints regulating commercial transactions are likely to differ across countries. International trade agreements may also vary across country pairs. Moreover, the stringency and specificities of the judicial systems are subject to national standards. The features of the legal system are of particular importance in the context of intellectual property, as patent infringement can lead to substantial losses and gains on firms revenues. 5 Finally, cultural differences between countries may also affect the timing of agreements on the market for ideas. 6 Furthermore, we focus on licensing deals between firms with no corporate relationship. We expect the mechanisms underlying licensing deals between companies that are part of the same parent group to be intrinsically different from those underlying deals between unrelated entities. Indeed, information circulates internally though different channels, and contracting is less complex. We also drop licensing deals involving several licensors.
There might be concerns that some licensing deals could be missing from our sample. Indeed, registration of a license transaction is not mandatory in France. However, as mentionned by Ménière et al. (2012) , in France patent transfer contracts shall only be enforceable against third parties from the time when they are registered. It means that infringement damages cannot be obtained for the period after the contract but prior to the registration, providing incentives for the registration of licensing agreements. Moreover, missing observations would generate a bias in our analysis on the effect of geographical on the timing of licensing only if the propensity to register of the contracting parties is non orthogonal to the part of geographical distance that affects the timing of the transaction.
For example, if parties located far from each other tend to not register the deal only when the timing of the transaction has been affected by geographical distance. We believe that such setting is quite restrictive, and unlikely to occur.
Confounding factors
As explained, excessive licensing delays are harmful for social welfare. However, long licensing delays are not necessarily "excessive". Longer licensing delays could be due to the maturity of the traded technology. In this setting, short licensing delay might involve early technologies, that still require R&D efforts to be performed for commercialization; while long licensing delay might reflect the transfer of mature and "ready-to-commercialize" technologies. However, it is also possible that less mature, and thus less developed technologies, have a longer timing of licensing. Indeed, their field of application and their value are harder to evaluate, and they contain more tacit knowledge.
It is theoretically possible that licensing deals between firms close to each other involve more early technologies, while transactions between entities located further from each other include more mature technologies. In this setting, geographical distance would be associated with longer licensing delays, while it would not necessarily be harmful for social welfare.
We account for the intrinsic characteristics of the traded technology with the inclusion of three control variables. First, we include the share that references to scientific non-patent literature represent in the total number of citations of the technology. Scientific references represent the linkage of patents with science (Harhoff et al., 2003) . Second, we include the difference in days between the earliest priority date, and the latest filing date. 7 Third, we include the average age of patent references. The share of scientific references captures the applicability of the technology, while the difference in priority dates is a proxy for the degree of development of the technology to the firm. The average age of patent references is a proxy for the maturity of the technology.
Estimation method
We employ a Cox proportional hazard model of survival analysis on our sample of licensing transactions, following Gans et al. (2008) . The Cox proportional hazard model studies the relationship between the explanatory variables and the time-to-failure. In our setting, the "failure" event is the licensing deal, so that the dependant variable is the licensing lag, in days. 8 The Cox proportional hazard model builds on the hazard function, which quantifies the rate at which a transaction that
has not yet occurred at a given point of time will instantaneously be completed. It can be seen as an indicator of the risk of experiencing the event of licensing (for more details on the Cox proportional hazard model, see George et al., 2014) . Equation 1 shows the functional form of a Cox hazard model.
As presented in Equation 1, the Cox hazard model incorporates a non-parametric baseline hazard rate λ 0 (t) (which is the risk of instantaneous failure for individuals with X i =0, conditional on no previous failure) and an exponential term with the set of explanatory variables X (Lancaster, 1992) .
The variable λ license is the instantaneous probability of failure at t, conditional on survival until t.
The Cox proportional hazard model infers that the explanatory variables have a multiplicative effect, observed through the hazard ratios e βx , on the hazard.
The key assumption behind the Cox proportional hazard model is the assumption of proportional hazards, i.e. the assumption that multiplicative effects should be independent of time. It means that the ratio of the instantaneous hazard rates of two individuals should not vary over time. Following Gans et al. (2008) , we assume that the underlying timing of licensing might differ significantly across the technological sectors, and stratify the baseline hazard rate accordingly.
Data

Licensing deals
We create a dataset of licensing deals of French patents. There are two routes to obtain patent protection in France. First, one can seek patent protection in France following the national route by applying directly at the Institut National de la Propriété Industrielle (INPI), the local patent office.
The second route is the European route. The patent is then granted by the European Patent Office (EPO), and validated in France. Both types of patents are included in our data.
We combine data on licensing deals from two different sources. We first rely on data provided by INPI. These data contain detailed information on licensing deals of French patents (including patents having followed the European route for post grant events only), such as the effective date of the agreement. The data provided by INPI also include comprehensive information on the patent applicant, as well as on the licensee. We supplement this first set of data with data extracted from the PATSTAT Register, Autumn 2016 edition. The PATSTAT Register contains detailed information on the legal events affecting European applications. We thus retrieve additional licensing agreements involving European patent applications eventually validated in France.
We define a licensing deal as a unique "patent -licensee -license date" triplet. Our original dataset contains 1,155 licensing deals on French patents, between French firms with no corporate relationships.
Actors of the deal
Each French firm is associated with a unique identifier, attributed by the French national statistics bureau. This unique identifier, called a Siren number, is the main key of the Sirene database. The Sirene database has been publicly released for the first time in January 2017, and lists detailed information on active French firms and their establishments.
We retrieve the Siren number of each firm involved in licensing deal, and match our dataset of licensing deals with the Sirene Database, April 2017 version. 9 After this round of matching, our final sample is composed of 418 licensing deals. There are two reasons why our rate of matching is of around 35%. First, the Siren numbers are not systematically reported by INPI, and are never reported by the EPO. We retrieved some of them manually, but adopted a conservative approach. We replaced a missing Siren number only in the case where both the firm name and the postal code from our database on licensing deals matched with the Sirene information. When a firm could correspond to several Siren numbers, we chose to keep its Siren number as missing value. Second, the Sirene database contains information on active firms, and was not publicly released before 2017. Therefore, we are unable to match firms that are no longer operating in 2017. Note that we need to be able to match both the licensor and the licensee to the Sirene database, which complicates matters further. The relational context is an important factor on the market for technologies. Trust between the actors of the transaction has been found to have a significant effect on the success of negotiations (Jensen et al., 2015) . We control for the common history between actors of the licensing deal with the Past interaction dummy variable. It is equal to one either if the two parties of the contract have already successfully interacted on the market for technology, or if they have co-applied on a joint patent prior to the licensing agreement.
We also include information at the patent level, such as the priority filing date, the application date, and the grant date. We create non-mutually exclusive technological dummy variables, following the WIPO classification: Chemistry, Instruments, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and Other Fields (Schmoch, 2008) .
Different licensing deals can be concluded at the same date, between the same licensor and the same licensee. Such deals are likely to be part of the same negotiations on a bundle of patents. The objective of this paper is to understand the effect of distance between parties on the timing of the negotiations. By considering each of the patent in separate deals, we may artificially duplicate the same contract, possibly leading to biased results. In that matter, we identify "transactions", where a transaction is defined as either a single or a bundle of patents transferred between two firms on a specific day.
The size of the transaction is captured by the variable Transaction size (that is, the number of licensed patents). The variables Number references and Share scientific references respectively capture the number of distinct references that are contained in the bundle, and the share of the total number of references that scientific references represent. 11 The variable Mean age patent references capture the average age of patent references, at the bundle level. It is computed as the mean of the differences between the filing years of the citing and the cited patents. The variable Number IPC subclasses represents the number of distinct IPC-4 subclasses contained in the transferred technology, i.e. in the bundle. The variable Distance earliest priority latest filing captures the number of days between the earliest priority date and the latest filing date of the patents belonging to a bundle (it is zero if the bundle is composed from a single priority patent). This dataset is composed of 306 transactions.
Geographical distance
We define the variable Distance contracting parties as the geographical distance between the two contracting parties. It is computed using the GPS coordinates of the postal codes reported on the licensing agreement at the patent office. This variable represents our main measure of geographical distance, and is computed using the GPS coordinates of the postal codes associated with the parties' address. It is therefore very precise.
We create two additional measures of geographical distance for robustness purposes. Each firm is composed of one or several establishments, possibly situated in various locations in France. Using the Sirene database, we retrieve the location of each establishment of both the licensor and the licensee. Distance establishments is defined as the distance between the closest establishments of the licensor and the licensee. 12 Distance headquarters is created following the same logic, and measures the geographical distance between the headquarters of the licensor and the licensee.
Technology and Market proximity
We measure the technological distance between the licensor k and the licensee j in the following way:
where c stands for one of the 646 International Patent Classification (IPC) four-digit subclasses.
We retrieve the IPC four-digit subclasses of every French patent applied for by each firm from our sample, and define p i,c as the share of patents applied for by firm i that belong to the IPC fourdigit subclass c. T echnological proximity k,j is basically the opposite of the Euclidean distance in the technology space between the patent portfolios of firms k and j. Thus, zero means that the firms are technologically identical.
We measure market proximity with the sectoral proximity of activities. Market proximity is a dummy variable equal to one if the licensor and the licensee operate in the same industry. 13 to scientific literature. However, conditional on having at least one scientific reference, the proportion reaches 41% (not reported). The mean age of patent references is 15.6 years (the minimum is 1, and the maximum 65).
Descriptive Evidence
The central focus of this paper is the analysis of the effect of distance on the timing of technology licensing. Our main measure of geographical distance measures the distance between the contracting parties as reported in the licensing agreement. It ranges from 0 to 847 kilometers (mean = 229 kilometers). We also include two complementary measures of geographical distance: the distance between the closest establishments of the licensor and the licensee (mean = 156 kilometers), and the distance between the headquarters (mean = 232 kilometers).
We measure market proximity with the proximity of firms' sectoral activities. In 28% of the transactions, the licensor and the licensee operate in the same industry, and might therefore be competitors.
Our measure of technological proximity ranges between -1.94 and 0 (mean = -0.85, standard deviation = 0.43). It is missing for 134 transactions, due to the fact that some licensees never applied for a patent.
As described in the previous section, our data contain firm and patent characteristics. Licensees are on average 22 years old at the time of the deal, and own 253 patents. These figures reach 27 years old and 310 patents for the licensors. Licensees and licensors are small enterprises in respectively 59%
and 53% of the transactions, and jointly small enterprises in 36% of the cases (not reported). In 14% of the transactions, the licensor and the licensee have had past interactions.
Regarding the technological composition of the bundles, Mechanical Engineering, Other Fields and Chemistry are the most represented technological sectors. suggests that, although SMEs are quicker on the market for technologies, they also tend to act on a more local scale. The issue of the effect of geographical distance seems to be of particular interest for this type of actors, and the regression analysis will shed more light on it. Table 5 presents the results of our baseline regressions. The dependent variable is the licensing lag, in days, between the licensing date, and the first priority date of the bundle of transferred patents.
Regression Results
Baseline regressions
Standards errors are robust, and hazard ratios are stratified at the technological sector level. All the regressions contains licensor, licensee, technology, and transaction control variables. They also include year, licensor industry, and licensee industry fixed effects. As evidenced in the descriptive findings, we think that the marginal effect of an additional kilometer to the timing of licensing is decreasing with the distance. Therefore, we choose to use the logarithm of the geographical distance, in kilometers.
We report robust standard errors. We display the hazard rate ratios, which should be analysed as relative to one: a ratio greater than one indicates a catalysing effect of the corresponding variable on the timing of licensing, while a ratio lower than one reflects a delaying effect.
The objective of this first set of regressions is to empirically test Hypotheses 1 and 3. In Columns (1) to (4), we present the results of our baseline Cox hazard regressions. The first specification, presented in column (1), examines the impact of geographical distance on the timing of the licensing deal. The estimate associated with the geographical distance is significant at the 5% level, and implies that an increase of one kilometer in the logarithm of the distance decreases the underlying hazard rate by 13%. Put differently, and given the multiplicative structure of the Cox regression, an increase of five in the logarithm of the geographical distance reduces the probability of instantaneous licensing by more than 50%.
The second specification, in column (2), adds the market proximity as a regressor. By doing so, we control for the fact that the contracting parties might be market competitors. The coefficient associated with the market proximity is lower than one, and statistically significant at the 5% level, meaning that the probability of immediate licensing is hampered by market proximity. More precisely, the associated coefficient implies that market proximity decreases the underlying hazard rate by 45%.
The effect associated with geographical distance is of slightly higher magnitude than in specification
(1), and is significant at the 1% level.
In the third specification, in column (3), we add the technological proximity between the parties as an explanatory variable. 14 The hazard associated with the technological proximity is not statistically different from one, meaning that we find no evidence for a catalysing or delaying effect of technological proximity on the timing of the licensing transaction. The coefficient associated with the geographical distance is still highly significant, and lower than one.
The last Cox specification, in column (4), includes both the market and the technological proximities as regressors. Previous results hold, and the hazard ratio associated with the geographical distance is statistically significant at the 1% level, and lower than in the previous specifications. It means that the associated effect on the underlying hazard rate is of higher magnitude. More specifically, controlling for both the market and the technological proximities, an increase of one in the logarithm of the distance between the parties decreases the probability of immediate licensing by 15%. Market proximity is still found to be a significant delayer of the timing of the transaction, while we find no statistically significant effect for technological proximity.
Column (5) and Column (6) respectively present estimations using exponential and Weibull proportional hazard models. Unlike the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model, the parametric exponential and Weibull survival models make assumptions on the form of the baseline hazard func-14 When our measure of technological proximity is missing -i.e. when the licensee did not apply for any French patent -we replace the missing value by -2 (the real minimum is -1.93).
tion. The Weibull hazard model assumes that λ(t) = pλt p−1 · e (β X X i ) , with parameters p and λ, where
The parameter p characterizes the evolution of risk over time. For instance, when p is greater than 1 the risk is increasing over time.
The exponential proportional hazard model is a specific case of the Weibull model, where p = 1. It assumes that the baseline hazard rate do not vary over time, so that λ 0 (t) becomes λ 0 in Equation 1.
The results are partly in accordance with the previous findings. Geographical distance has a still significant negative effect on the timing of licensing. The coefficient associated with technological proximity is still not significantly different from one. As to market proximity, although the signs of the associated effects are identical to previous regressions, they are of lower magnitude, and not statistically significant.
Altogether, the results from the first set of regressions confirm Hypothesis 1. We control for confounding determinants of the timing of the deal, as well as for technological and market proximities.
We find that the timing of the licensing transaction significantly increases with the geographical distance between the contracting parties. The findings also disambiguate the effect of market proximity, which negatively affects the timing of licensing. Connecting this with Hypothesis 3, it suggests that the negative effect induced by market proximity on the contracting costs is higher than its positive effects on the search and information costs. Table 6 tests Hypothesis 2, and investigates whether SMEs are particularly sensitive to geographical distance. Each specification is run without and with the controls for technological and market proximities. All the regressions contain baseline fixed effects for SME licensors and SME licensee (columns (1), (2), (5) and (6)), or for SME to SME transactions (columns (3) and (4)).
Distance and SMEs
The first columns, (1) and (2), distinguish the effect of geographical distance on the timing of licensing, between deals involving a non-SME licensor, and deals involving a SME licensor. The effect associated with geographical distance is lower than one, but not statistically significant when the licensor is not a SME. However, when the licensor is a SME, the hazard ratio is significant at the 5% level. This findings hold while controlling for the technological and market proximities, and is then of higher magnitude. The associated coefficient in specification (2) implies that, when the licensor is a SME, an increase of one in the logarithm of geographical distance is associated with a decrease of 17% of the underlying hazard rate.
The next specifications, in columns (3) and (4), separate the effect of geographical distance for licensing transactions between SMEs, and for other transactions. The hazard ratio associated with geographical distance is significant at the 1% level for deals occurring between SMEs. The delaying effect of geographical distance is stronger than in the previous specifications. The corresponding coefficient implies that an increase of one in the logarithm of geographical distance between the contracting parties decreases the probability of immediate licensing by more than 22% (specification (4)). The effect of geographical distance on transactions involving at least one actor that is not a SME is also negative but not statistically significant.
The last specifications, in columns (5) and (6), distinguish the effect of geographical distance regarding the type of each actor (i.e. SME or not). We investigate the effect of geographical distance on four distinct types of transactions. First, the deals in which none of the actors is a SME. Second, the deals in which only the licensor is a SME. Third, the transactions in which only the licensee is a SME. Finally, the transactions in which both the licensor and the licensee are SMEs. The hazard rate associated with the geographical distance is statistically significant (at the 1% level) only in the context of a deal between two SMEs.
Altogether, the results from this second set of regressions confirm Hypothesis 2. We find that SMEs are more sensitive to geographical distance than larger firms. Moreover, the results suggest that the negative effect of geographical distance on SMEs is offset by the greater search and negotiation capabilities of larger firms. Table 7 presents the results of a set of additional regressions to assess the robustness of our baseline findings. Each regression is run without and with stratification of the hazards.
Robustness checks
In columns (1) and (2), we adopt a different definition of the timing of the deal. Instead of investigating the time lag between the first priority date of the bundle of transferred patents and the licensing date, we now consider the last priority date as the start of the search phase. The hazard rate associated with the geographical distance is still significantly lower than one, therefore confirming the validity of Hypothesis 1. The coefficient associated with market proximity is significantly lower than one, whereas the hazard ratio associated with the technological proximity is not statistically significant. The results support our previous conclusions regarding Hypothesis 3.
In columns (3) and (4) we measure geographical distance as the distance between the closest establishments of the licensor and the licensee -instead of the distance between the contracting parties.
In columns (5) and (6), we define geographical distance as the distance between the headquarters of the contracting parts. The estimates associated with the geographical distance are significantly lower than one in each of the regressions, further confirming Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the results of these regressions also confirm the adverse effect of market proximity on the timing of the licensing deal.
Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we deal differently with the observations having a missing technological proximity. Specification (7) adds a dummy variable equal to one for the observations with a missing technological proximity that was replaced. Specification (8) replaces the technological proximity by -0.84 (i.e. the mean) instead of replacing it by -2 (i.e. the minimum value). Our previous findings hold in these two specifications.
Conclusions
Market for technologies are global by nature. Technology is an intangible, non-rival good that is, a priori, not affected by geographical constraints. This feature is pivotal to the efficiency arguments of markets for technologies, i.e., the productivity gains induced by the specialisation of actors of the innovation chain. It ensures that technology can flow to where it will be put at its most productive use.
This paper explicitly challenges the view that markets for technology are global. Using arguments from transaction cost theory, we argue that geographical distance between buyers and sellers is likely to induce delays in the transfer of technologies. The empirical strategy stacks the odds against finding an effect. We focus on transactions between actors located in France, an homogeneous country that has excellent communication and travel infrastructure. Besides, we account for the fact that geographic variations in the timing of transactions do not necessarily reflect frictions on the markets for technologies. Indeed, features that make some technologies inherently more difficult to transfer may also be correlated with the geographic distance between parties. For that reason, the empirical analysis controls for confounding factors, notably the maturity and the sector of technologies, and the type of actors. Because firms may tend to gather into business clusters, we also control for market proximity and technology proximity.
The empirical analysis exploits a high-resolution dataset of 306 licensing transactions. In collecting the data, we favoured depth of information over breadth by focusing on licensing deals for which we could match both parties to a database providing demographic information about firms. This has allowed us also to exclude intra-company deals, and to exploit demographic data of parties.
The results suggest that geographic distance hurts licensing. We find that an increase of one in the logarithm of the geographical distance between the contracting parties decreases the licensing hazard rate by 17%. This effect is particularly strong for deals between SMEs, for which an increase of one in the logarithm of geographical distance reduces the probability of immediate licensing by more than 22%.
Because the analysis focuses on licensing deals, it is silent on factors that affect the probability of a deal to occur in the first place. In all likelihood, geographic distance may also affect the chance that parties meet, further amplifying the role of geography in markets for technologies. Future studies could assess mechanisms that actors use to overcome to burden of distance.
The paper also comes with policy implications. First, it calls for European policy makers to redouble their efforts to work towards an integrated European market for technology. Indeed, the fact that frictions induced by geographic distance hurts technology transfer in France alone leads us to believe that frictions would have been stronger if we had carried the study on the European market for technology. At the same time, the existence of geographic frictions in France suggests that some level of frictions in the European market for technology is inevitable. Second, special efforts should be devoted to supporting SMEs. We know from previous studies that SMEs have a higher willingness to license than large firms (Gambardella et al., 2007; de Rassenfosse, 2012 ) but they do not seem to be able to cope well with deals involving geographically-distant parties. Note: 10 observations had a missing filing date for their patent references, resulting in a missing average age of patent references. We replaced them by the average value of the sample (15.6). We define scientific references are references to non-patent literature of types s, a, b, e and w. By construction, the technological proximity indicator is missing when the licensee has not applied for any patent (134 observations). The dummies for the technological sectors are equal to one if at least one patent in the bundle belongs to the technological sector. Note: Hazard Ratios are displayed. Robust Standard Errors. Geographical distance is the Distance_contracting_parts in log.
We replace the missing technological proximity by -2. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Note: Hazard rate ratios are displayed. Robust Standard Errors. In Column (1) and (2), the origin is the last priority date (instead of the first priority date in the other regressions). In Column (8), the missing values for the technological proximity are replaced by -0.84 (instead of -2 in the other regressions) * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
